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Holding the FBI Accountable for Hacking Apple's Software Under the Takings
Clause
Abstract
Smartphones have swiftly replaced most-if not all-conventional methods of sending, receiving, and
storing personal information. Letters, address books, calendars, and trips to the bank have been rendered
obsolete by tools such as text messaging, digital contacts, iCal, and mobile banking apps. Although these
digital alternatives are convenient, they are not immune from attack. Therefore, to remain competitive,
technology companies must maintain safe and secure platforms on which users may freely store and
share their personal information.
Apple Inc., for example, strives to protect its users' intimate information, consequently earning a
reputation for prioritizing security. Like a king protecting his castle, Apple has erected a variety of
technological and legal barriers to guard its users' data and ward off unwanted intruders from
vulnerabilities at a variety of stages. First, to protect user data from unauthorized access, Apple's
software authorizes iPhone users to set their own passcode. Next, Apple encrypts its iPhone software,
essentially placing adigital padlock on its software to preclude any software alterations, including the
user-determined passcode functionality. Lastly, Apple copyrights its encryption padlock, discouraging
rogue actors from circumventing its technology and security features in fear of civil or criminal
implications.
In the spring of 2016, however, the federal government pillaged Apple's digital fortress, overcoming each
of these barriers. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was investigating the terrorist attack in San
Bernardino, California, and Apple's security mechanisms precluded access to a shooter's iPhone, which
was locked with the user-determined passcode. Nonetheless, the FBI hired professional hackers to alter
Apple's software, thereby circumventing Apple's encryption and ignoring Apple's copyrights, to access the
iPhone.
Although the FBI opened just this one phone, just this one time, its hacking has much broader
implications. By altering Apple's software to circumvent its encryption, it smashed Apple's digital padlock,
essentially creating a master key capable of opening hundreds of millions of iPhones, jeopardizing users'
intimate information. The FBI has devalued Apple's coveted security and risked Apple's reputation.
Despite Apple's copyright, Apple has no statutory remedy available; however, the Takings Clause in the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution affords Apple a simple solution.
This Note contributes to the contentious debate about prioritizing individual privacy in the face of
increasingly innovative and complex national security threats. It suggests a novel way to deter
governmental intrusion by establishing that Apple's copyrights are "prroperty" under the Fifth Amendment
and by characterizing the FBI's investigative conduct in the San Bernardino case as a "taking" under the
Fifth Amendment. Constitutionally requiring the federal government to pay 'just compensation"
necessarily compels it to consider in its calculus the economic consequences of circumventing a
technology company's encryption, potentially preventing such intrusion in the first place.
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NOTE
HOLDING THE FBI ACCOUNTABLE
FOR HACKING APPLE'S SOFTWARE
UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
MARK S. LEVY*

Smartphones have swiftly replaced most-if not all-conventionalmethods
of sending, receiving, and storing personal information. Letters, address
books, calendars, and trips to the bank have been rendered obsolete by tools
such as text messaging, digital contacts, iCal, and mobile banking apps.
Although these digital alternativesare convenient, they are not immune from
attack. Therefore, to remain competitive, technology companies must maintain
safe and secure platforms on which users may freely store and share their
personalinformation.
Apple Inc., for example, strives to protect its users' intimate information,
consequently earning a reputation for prioritizing security. Like a king
protecting his castle, Apple has erected a variety of technological and legal
barriers to guard its users' data and ward off unwanted intruders from
vulnerabilities at a variety of stages. First, to protect user data from
unauthorized access, Apple's software authorizes iPhone users to set their own
passcode. Next, Apple encrypts its iPhone software, essentially placing adigital padlock on its software to preclude any software alterations, including
the user-determined passcode functionality. Lastly, Apple copyrights its
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would like to thank the talented American University Law Review staff for its hard work
and meticulous focus.
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encryption padlock, discouraging rogue actors from circumventing its
technology and security features in fear of civil or criminal implications.
In the spring of 2016, however, the federal government pillaged Apple's
digital fortress, overcoming each of these barriers. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) was investigating the terrorist attack in San Bernardino,
California, and Apple's security mechanisms precluded access to a shooter's
iPhone, which was locked with the user-determinedpasscode. Nonetheless, the
FBI hired professional hackers to alter Apple's software, thereby circumventing
Apple's encryption and ignoringApple's copyrights, to access the iPhone.
Although the FBI opened just this one phone, just this one time, its hacking
has much broader implications. By alteringApple's software to circumvent its
encryption, it smashed Apple's digital padlock, essentially creating a master
key capable of opening hundreds of millions of iPhones, jeopardizing users'
intimate information. The FBI has devalued Apple's coveted security and
risked Apple's reputation. Despite Apple's copyright, Apple has no statutory
remedy available; however, the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution affords Apple a simple solution.
This Note contributes to the contentious debate about prioritizingindividual
privacy in the face of increasingly innovative and complex national security
threats. It suggests a novel way to deter governmental intrusion by establishing
that Apple's copyrights are "prroperty" under the Fifth Amendment and by
characterizingthe FBI's investigative conduct in the San Bernardino case as a
"taking" under the Fifth Amendment. Constitutionally requiring the federal
government to pay 'just compensation" necessarily compels it to consider in its
calculus the economic consequences of circumventing a technology company's
encryption, potentially preventingsuch intrusion in the first place.
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"Datais the pollution problem of the information age, and protectingprivacy
is the environmental challenge."
-Bruce

Schneierl

INTRODUCTION

Employers customarily host workplace holiday parties to thank

their employees and celebrate their hard work over the
nothing was customary, however, about one holiday
December 2, 2015, in San Bernardino, California. The
festive music and laughter were quickly replaced by

past year;
party on
sounds of
deafening

gunshots and screams for help when Syed Rizwan Farook and

Tashfeen Malik opened fire on a crowd of innocent victims.' Fourteen
people were violently slain; twenty-two people were senselessly injured.'
The tragedy stirred emotions across the country, but it also relaunched
an important legal debate about individual privacy.
Law enforcement officers often struggle to understand why
individuals commit such heinous crimes, but these two assassins left
behind one item that could provide clarity: an iPhone. However, the
federal government encountered a roadblock in its investigation
when it sought to access the locked iPhone of one of the shooters.'
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hoped to find inculpatory
evidence and uncover other parties who may have been involved in
the attack.'
But, a user-determined passcode blocked law
enforcement's access to the phone, and the FBI risked the phone's
data automatically erasing if it guessed the wrong passcode just ten

1.

DATA AND GOLIATH:

THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT

YouR

DATA AND

238 (2015).
2. Nathan Rott, San Bernardino Shooting's Signs Have Faded, but Memories Remain
Piercing, NPR (Dec. 2, 2016, 4:47 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/12/02/504025469
/san-bernardino-shootings-signs-have-faded-but-memories-remain-piercing.
3. Id.
4. See generally Steven Musil, Apple Ordered to Help Unlock San Bernardino Shooter's
iPhone, CNET (Feb. 16, 2016, 6:00 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-orderedto-unlock-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone.
5. Government's Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to
Assist Agents in Search, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution
of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300 at 2, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 680288,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Government's Ex Parte Application].
CONTROL YOUR WORLD
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times.' Though it obtained a federal court order directing Apple Inc.
("Apple") to design new software that would help the agency open
the iPhone,' the FBI felt the wheels ofjustice were turning too slowly,
so it took matters into its own hands. It hired professional hackers to
circumvent the shooter's passcode, smashing the digital lock that
protected Apple's copyrighted software and jeopardizing the security
and privacy of hundreds of millions of people storing sensitive
information on their iPhones.'
The events following the San Bernardino massacre stoked the coals
of a fire already burning bright among individuals with varying
religions, philosophies, and ideologies. They reinvigorated a debate
the nation has wrestled with many times since September 11-one
concentrated at the intersection of national security and individual
privacy. Americans differ as to how the federal government should
balance these competing interests,' but the debate does not always
consider other important concerns, such as the extraordinary
economic cost of exposing intimate information.
In the modern world, effortless access to information is within an
arm's length at all hours of the day. We use devices like iPhones both
to explore the depths of the Internet and to store our most intimate
personal information. Although information is the lifeblood of our
economy and we often desire open access, we also go to great lengths
to protect it."o Apple has done so by encrypting users' personal
6. FBI Overpaid $999,900 to Crack San Bernardino iPhone 5c Password, REGISTER
(Sept. 19, 2016, 4:58 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/09/19/fbi-overpaid
999900_tocracksan bernardino-iphone_5c-password.
7. See Eric Lichtblau, judge Tells Apple to Help Unlock iPhone Used by San Bernardino
Gunman, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/us/
(describing
judge-tells-apple-to-help-unlock-san-bernardino-gunmans-iphone.html
the FBI's troubles opening the iPhone and its plea to the court that "Apple had the
'exclusive' means to bypass the security features on the phone").
8. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San
BernardinoiPhone, WASH. PosT (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-sanbernardino-iphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-1 1e6-9d3633dl98ea26c5_story.html.
9. See Lee Rainie & Shiva Maniam, Americans Feel the Tensions Between Privacy and
TANK
(Feb.
19,
2016),
TR.:
FACT
Security
Concerns, PEW RES.
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/19/americans-feel-the-tensionsbetween-privacy-and-security-concerns (estimating that as of December 2015, "56% of
Americans were more concerned that the government's anti-terror policies have not
gone far enough to protect the country, compared with 28% who expressed concern
that the policies have gone too far in restricting the average person's civil liberties").
10. See, e.g., Nate Lord, What Is Data Encryption?, DIGrrAL GUARDIAN (Jan. 27,
(detailing that
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-data-encryption
2017),

2017]

FBI ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

1297

information stored in iPhones-essentially, a lock with only one
irreproducible key. However, these user-determined passcodes erect
formidable barriers for law enforcement officials investigating crimes.
Officials have recently begun developing ways to circumvent this
technology, but developing such access is not cheap, and it is the
technology company-not the government-that bears the ultimate
cost. While investigating the San Bernardino shooters, the federal
government crafted a master key capable of opening any userdetermined lock, jeopardizing the privacy of our personal
information and thus harming Apple's security and reputation.
This type of clandestine security breach casts a wide shadow,
leaving many of us in the dark about the government's attempt at
balancing national security and individual privacy. Users store a variety
of intimate information on their iPhones: financial records, emails, text
messages, family photos, and personal notes. Because the software to
circumvent Apple's user-determined passcodes did not exist before, the
FBI altered Apple's copyrighted software.n The alteration empowered
the FBI to access not only the San Bernardino shooter's iPhone but also
any iPhone 5c running the same operating system." The prospect that a
similar alteration may also empower the FBI to access any iPhone
running any operating system should alarm the millions of users who
rely on Apple's strong reputation for data security.
The U.S. Constitution, however, provides an explicit remedy for
such governmental intrusions. The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the federal government from taking "private
property . . without just compensation."" The Framers "designed [it]
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole."" However, Apple alone shouldered the public's burden
amid the investigation into the shooters in San Bernardino.
This Note advocates that the federal government owes Apple "just
compensation" under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
for hacking Apple's copyrighted software. Part I canvases the Takings
Clause and specifically discusses which items constitute "property" under
the Fifth Amendment and which forms of governmental intrusion
constitute a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment Next, Part II outlines
"[d]ata encryption translates data into... code, so that only people with access to a
secret key (formally called a decryption key) or password can read it").
11. Nakashima, supranote 8.

12. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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the federal government's role during the San Bernardino investigation,
describing the legal battle between Apple and the FBI and the FBI's
forcible breach into Apple's software. Part III provides the necessary
background on copyrights and contends that (1) copyrights constitute
"property" under the Fifth Amendment, and (2) the FBI's iPhone
hacking constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment.
Consequently, this Note concludes that the federal government owes
Apple 'just compensation" under the Takings Clause because the FBI
"took" Apple's property by designing and distributing software that
circumvented Apple's copyrighted iPhone software.
I.

TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Perhaps the most important value of law in society is the right it
confers on an individual to exclude others from his or her property."5
As a corollary, the right to exclude also includes the right to
consume, transfigure, transfer, bequeath, pledge as collateral, or
otherwise dispose of property as the owner wishes."6 The Founding
Fathers considered the right to exclude one of the pillars buttressing
our Republic, defining "property broadly to include 'Life, Liberty and
Estate.'"" Whether a property right is based in common law, such as
real and personal property, or in statute, such as patents and
copyrights, its economic value is in the owner's right to the sole
enjoyment of any benefits accruing from the property.
Legal scholars have described property ownership as a "major
battleground" to resolve the conflict stemming from "individual
liberty and privacy on the one hand and community and equality on
the other."" The Supreme Court has agreed, characterizing "the
right to exclude others" as "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."9 But,
15. In fact, the motivation behind the initial exploration of the Americas was to
"exploit the economic opportunities" that lay dormant in the undeveloped landscape
Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engerman,
of the Western hemisphere.
Institutions, FactorEndowments, and Paths of Development in the New World, 14 J. ECON.
PERsp. 217, 220 (2000).
16. Thomas W. Merrill, Propery and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730,730 (1998).
17. Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the
Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1136-37 (quoting
JOHN LocKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 341

(Peter Laslett ed., 1964) (1690)) (opining that "the most important value of the
Founding Fathers of the American constitutional period was their belief in the
necessity of securing property rights").
18. Robert C. Ellickson, Propertyin Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1345 (1993).
19. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,176 (1979).
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this fundamental right to exclude is not perfect. However natural
these rights may seem, or however entitled to them we may feel,
property rights are arbitrary and meaningless without "some
institutional structure that stands ready to enforce these rights."2 0
Ironically, however, the "institutional structure" charged with
protecting these rights also reserves for itself the authority to
undermine any legally obtained interest in property.2 1
Though the Framers reserved the federal government's ability to
appropriate private property for public use, they did so with the
caveat that a displaced owner must be compensated for the taking.
In the eighteenth century, the Framers imported the principle of
eminent domain from the Magna Carta, incorporating it into their
young colonial governments and eventually the Fifth Amendment of
The Takings Clause in the Fifth
the United States Constitution.
Amendment provides that the federal government shall not take
"private property . . for public use, without just compensation."
The Framers sought to prevent the "Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens" and to protect expectations of
exclusivity deriving from property.
It appears the Framers
specifically feared that private citizens would be deprived of their
property, subjected to intrusive government interference, or denied
the opportunity to use property to their competitive advantage.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence interpreting the Takings
Clause evinces a clear understanding that the federal government
must pay for private property that it chooses to appropriate. Any
comprehensive analysis includes two critical inquiries: (1) whether
the item at issue constitutes "property" under the Fifth Amendment,
20. Merrill, supra note 16, at 733.
21. See Steven J. Eagle, just Compensationfor Permanent Takings of Temporal Interests,
10 FED. CIR. B.J. 485, 486 (2001) (acknowledging that the Takings Clause "implicitly
recognizes that eminent domain is an inherent attribute of both the national and
state governments").
22. Indeed, the Magna Carta proscribed the King from appropriating "corn or
other provisions from any one [sic] without immediately tendering money therefor."
Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (quoting MAGNA CARTA cl. 28
(1215), in WILiAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 329 (2d ed. 1914)). John Locke, a colonist of Carolina,

prescribed 'just compensation" for government takings in the 1669 Fundamental
Constitution of Carolina. See Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and OriginalIntent:
The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far", 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 209 (1999)
(citing Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina art. 44 (1669), reprinted in 1 BERNARD
ScHwARTz, THE BILL OF RIGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 8, 115 (1971)).

23.
24.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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and (2) whether the government's conduct with the item constitutes
a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. 5
A.

Identifying What Constitutes "Property"

Despite the Framers' concerns about protecting property rights,
the Takings Clause fails to define "property." The Supreme Court,
however, has defined an expansive range of property that, if taken,
warrants compensation. For instance, the Court has deemed the
following "property" under the context of the Fifth Amendment:
realty, including buildings," easements," and the corresponding
airspace above the property;" personalty" and liens on personalty;'
government seizure of a business;" and intellectual property, such as
patents," trade secrets," and rights under a valid contract." Thus, the
Court considers "property" under the Takings Clause to include most
recognized property rights-whether derived from the Constitution,
statutes, or common law-that confer exclusivity on the owner.
25. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000 (1984); see also Note,
Copynght Reform and the Takings Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 973, 975--78 (2015).
26. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007, 1019 (1992)
(addressing a South Carolina law that prohibited a property owner from erecting a
house on beachfront property); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (discussing a New York law requiring landlords to permit a
cable television company to install equipment on the building).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910) (finding that "the
discontinuance of' an easement, here a private right of way, constituted interference
with a property right).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 -U.S. 256, 258, 266 (1946) (involving a dispute
in which frequent military aircrafts flew within "the immediate reaches above the land").
29. See, e.g., Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424-25 (2015) (reviewing
a federal statute obligating raisin growers to give a percentage of their crops to the
government).
30. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46 (1960) (assessing a
dispute in which the government compelled petitioner to transfer valid liens against
both hulls and material held for use in building boats).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115, 117 (1951)
(considering a coal mine "possessed and operated for public use").
32. See James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882) (explaining that a patent
confers an "exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be
appropriated or used by the government itself, without just compensation, any more
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented
to a private purchaser").
33. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990, 1003-04 (1984)
(evaluating the EPA's obligating pesticide companies to disclose data that the agency
later used to evaluate other pesticides).
34. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (concerning insurance
policies under the War Risk Insurance Act of 1917).
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Nonetheless, not all legal entitlements of exclusivity necessarily
amount to "property" under the Fifth Amendment." For instance,
although copyrights confer the owner exclusivity to creative works such
as literary and musical compositions, 6 the Court has remained silent on
whether copyrights constitute "property" under the Fifth Amendment
However, various federal courts of appeals-including the First,37
Second,"3 Fifth,3 Sixth," and Ninth" circuits-have suggested that
governments may be obligated to compensate private individuals for
taking, or even shortening the lives of, copyrights.' Legal scholars have
also contended that the Takings Clause should apply to valid
copyrights.4 3 Realty and personalty certainly constitute "property" under

35. Copyright Reform and the Takings Clause, supra note 25, at 977 ("[T]he mere
fact that a person enjoys some legal benefit does not entitle the person to continue
enjoying it.").
36.

U.S.

COPYRIGHT

OFFICE,

CIRCULAR

1:

COPYRIGHT

BAsics

1

(2012),

https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ0l.pdf.
37. See Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting
that copyrights are property, and if the state government "afford[ed] [the plaintiff]
no just compensation for the wrongful confiscation of her property, the Takings
Clause of the federal Constitution might at that point enable her to pursue a damage
remedy in federal court").
38. See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 74
(2d Cir. 1994) (cautioning, in dicta, that "a state legislature or administrative body
depriv[ing] the copyright owner of its property would raise very substantial problems
under the Takings Clause of the Constitution").
39. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1998), reh'g en
banc granted, vacated, 178 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 1998), and on rehg en banc, 180 F.3d 674
(5th Cir. 1999) ("[C]opyrights constitute intangible property that, for some purposes
at least, receives constitutional protection.").
40. See Cawley v. Swearer, No. 90-1981, 1991 WL 108725, at *3 (6th Cir. June 20,
1991) (per curiam) (stating that "the Copyright Act does not preempt the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause").
41. See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir.
1997), amended, 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming that the plaintiffs copyright
"should be enforced" despite the copyrighted material being adopted by federal
regulation-in part because the regulatory adoption would otherwise create Takings
Clause concerns).
42. At least one appeals court, the Federal Circuit, has acknowledged but so far
avoided the question. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (per curiam), vacated, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (electing not to
"reach the issue of the Government's possible liability under the Constitution for a
taking").
43. Compare Copyright Reform and the Takings Clause, supra note 25, at 981-82
(arguing that "the weight of scholarly opinion is that copyrights are property for
takings purposes"), and Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of IntellectualProperty Implicate
the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FIA. L. REV. 529, 532 (1998) (noting that the issue of copyrights
and takings "has evoked wildly differing responses, ranging from the view that virtually
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the Fifth Amendment, yet there is no legally binding Supreme Court
precedent on whether the government owes a private individual 'just
compensation" for appropriating a copyright.
B.

Identifying What Constitutes a "Taking"

Although the "property" at issue may satisfy the first inquiry under
the Fifth Amendment, the government's conduct must also satisfy the
second inquiry for protection: whether the conduct amounts to a
"taking." Conventional notions of what constitutes a taking involve
physical deprivation of land, such as when the government acquires a
parcel of private land for an easement or destroys an automobile in
the process of extinguishing a fire in an adjacent building.'
However, the Court has also labeled unconventional deprivations of
private property as takings. 5 For instance, if the effects of a
governmental regulation are so severe as to essentially "deprive the
owner of all or most of his interest" in the property, courts may
accurately characterize the conduct as a taking.'
The legal community may prefer hard and fast rules, but the
checkered jurisprudence concerning the Takings Clause has evinced
anything but clarity. The Court has "recognized few invariable rules"
and "has generally eschewed" any rigid "magic formula" to compute a
government taking." Rather, takings analyses can be more aptly
depicted as a spectrum of governmental interference, varying in the
magnitude of deprivation." At one end of the spectrum, conduct
all government uses of intellectual property constitute takings to the view that virtually
none of them do"), with Tom W. Bell, Cpyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 58
SYRAcusE L. REv. 523, 545-46 (2008) (advocating that copyrights are "intellectual
privilege [s]" rather than property interests under the Takings Clause).
44. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004 (1984) (characterizing
traditional deprivations of property under the Takings -Clause as "governmental
acquisition [s] or destruction of... property").
45. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 -U.S. 373, 378 (1945)
("Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its
effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the
subject matter, to amount to a taking.").
46. See id. For instance, a city ordinance that bars land owners from constructing
buildings on their property, rendering them valueless, may properly constitute a
governmental taking. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007, 1030 (1992).
47. Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2015) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31
(2012)); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
48. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court
identified "two discrete categories of regulatory [takings]": (1) "regulations that
compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his property," and (2)
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fails to rise to the level of a "taking" where it clearly constitutes a
governmental nuisance rather than a governmental deprivation.
At the other end of the spectrum, conduct clearly constitutes a
"taking" where the government undoubtedly deprives the owner of
complete use of the property, such as capturing land and deeming it
a public easement." The Court has branded this type of government
conduct a "per se taking," of which there are two core varieties.' The
first type of per se taking involves government conduct that either
denotes or sanctions "permanent physical occupation" of property
regardless of the public interest it serves. In Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.," for example, a statute required landlords to
permit cable television companies to install their equipment on the
roof of the building for the benefit of the tenants." The Court found
that the equipment installation amounted to a "permanent physical
occupation" of the landlord's property, thereby constituting a
taking." The second type of per se taking involves government
conduct that does not physically invade private property but
nevertheless renders property economically worthless. For instance,
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council," a state statute prevented
beachfront property owners from erecting any buildings on such
property." The Court found that these statutes constituted a taking
because they rendered the lots "valueless" by "prohibit[ing] all
economically beneficial use of [the] land."' In other words, the
government "denie [d] an owner economically viable use of his land"
vis-4-vis regulation.
Accordingly, per se takings are ostensibly
regulations that fall short of physical invasion, but deny "all economically beneficial
or productive use of land." Id. at 1015; see also Bethany Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal
Illusion in Regulatory Takings, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (2017) (exploring the takings
spectrum); Copyright Reform and the Takings Clause, supra note 25, at 977-78
(bifurcating the discussion into distinct "modes of analysis": (1) "per se takings" and
(2) "Penn Central' takings).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 338-39 (1910) (deeming the
government flooding of a private right of way to be a "taking").
50. See, e.g., Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424-26, 2430 (finding a per se taking where the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Raisin Administrative Committee required raisin
growers to give the government a portion of their raisin crops).
51. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
52. Id. at 423.
53. Id.at426.
54. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
55. Id. at 1007.
56. Id. at 1007, 1029.
57. Id. at 1016 (emphasis omitted). In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 554 U.S. 528
(2005), the Court lamented that whether a regulation "substantially advances" a
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categorical and collectively possess attributes of aggressive
encroachment on private property.
In between the two clear extremes of the governmental
interference spectrum, "Penn Central' takings occupy the muddled
middle ground in which courts analyze the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether government conduct constitutes
Unlike per se takings, which prevent owners from
a taking.'
enjoying all economic benefit from the property at issue, a "Penn
Central' taking prevents owners from enjoying some portion of
economic benefit from the property. In Penn CentralTransportationCo. v.
New York City," New York City imposed "restrictions on the development
of individual historic landmarks" and established a gatekeeper with the
authority to approve or reject "any proposal to alter the exterior
architectural features of [a] landmark."a Although the owner of such a
historic landmark still had the ability to use and profit from the building,
the ordinance deprived him of unfettered control of his property. A
subsequently rejected proposal sparked litigation, but it also triggered a
notable transformation in the law, prompting the Court to furnish three
factors to determine whether governmental interference is tantamount
(1) "the
to a constitutional taking requiring just compensation:
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations," and (3) "the character of the governmental action."6
Essentially, in Penn Central takings, the government may justify the
deprivation if it "substantially advance [s] legitimate state interests."62 As
a result, Penn Central takings require "situation-specific factual
and the outcome of challenges to governmental
inquiries, "
interference under the Penn Central takings theory is more fortuitous
than challenges pursuant to the per se takings theory. Penn Central
takings are a "relatively recent development" that arguably
complicate an already murky area of law.'
legitimate government interest "is not a valid takings test," thus obviating the need for any
analysis on the intent or purpose behind the government's conduct. Id. at 548.
58. CopyrightReform and the Takings Clause, supranote 25, at 1015.
59. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60. Id. at 107,112.
61. Id. at 124; see also Kenneth J. Sanney, Balancing the Friction: How a
Constitutional Challenge to Copyright Law Could Realign the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 323, 336 n.35 (2014).
62. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
63. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32 (2012).
64. Sanney, supra note 61, at 333-35 (asserting that the approach has "created an
unsettled and unpredictable body of law").
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FBI'SJOURNEY TO HACKAPPLE'S IOS SOFTWARE

The intrusive hacking into the Apple iPhone provides a sobering
presentation of the federal government's power. The public widely
condemned the malevolent terrorism that occurred in San Bernardino
on December 2, 2015; however, the subsequent events that transpired
in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California incited a
national conversation concerning the balance between individual
privacy and national security. As the FBI scrambled to make sense of
an otherwise senseless crime, it sought answers in the shooter's locked
iPhone." From the iPhone, the FBI sought to unlock the iPhone "to
determine . . who [the shooters] may have communicated with to
plan and carry out the . . shootings, where [the shooters] may have
traveled to and from before and after the incident, and other pertinent
information that would provide more information about their and
others' involvement."' To gain access to the iPhone, the FBI turned
to a federal court, requesting that Apple unlock the iPhone to help
the FBI make sense of what had happened. 7
On February 16, 2016, roughly two months after the deadly
shooting, the federal government filed an ex parte application for an
order compelling Apple to assist the FBI in unlocking the iPhone.'
The government pleaded with the court that, under the All Writs Act,"
"Apple ha[d] the exclusive technical means" to unlock the iPhone and
"Apple's assistance [was] necessary to effectuate the [valid search]
7
warrant."o
It claimed Apple's assistance was necessary because Apple
designed its iOS 9 operating system to encrypt and protect the files
stored on its devices.7 1 Specifically, three technological barriers
prevented the government from accessing the iPhone: (1) the phone

65. See Musil, supra note 4 (explaining that the iPhone of the San Bernardino shooter
was "password protected, and investigators worr[ied] that the handset's encryption
[would] erase its data after too many unsuccessful attempts to unlock the device").
66. Government's Ex Parte Application, supra note 5, at 2.
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (2012) ("[A]ll [federal] courts. ... may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law."). Although the government's utilization of the All
Writs Act to compel Apple's cooperation generated controversy in and of itself, that
topic is beyond the scope of this Note. See Amy Davidson, The DangerousAll Writs Act
Precedent in the Apple Encryption Case, NEW YORKER (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/a-dangerous-all-writ-precedent-inthe-apple-case.
70. Government's Ex Parte Application, supra note 5, at 1, 16.
71. Id. at 5.
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was "secured with a user-determined, numeric passcode"; (2) the
phone had an "auto-erase function," which permanently destroyed its
data "after 10 erroneous attempts at the passcode"; and (3) the
encryption key was "fused into the phone itself during manufacture,"
so that Apple must "modify [the] software" to guarantee that the "autoerase function is turned off' to protect the files.
Despite a swift and succinct order granting the government's
request and compelling Apple to assist in the investigation,73 Apple
moved to vacate the order shortly thereafter, proffering three
essential reasons for its non-compliance.7 ' First, Apple informed the
court that iPhone users store intimate and vital information that
would become "vulnerable to hackers, identity thieves, hostile foreign
Apple
agents, and unwarranted government surveillance."7
an
otherwise
crippling
as
efforts
characterized the government's
secure product.76 Second, Apple alerted the court that the software
the government envisioned would effectively create a "back door" to
its operating system, and that Apple would have to dedicate six to ten
Apple engineers to "create a new version of the iPhone operating
system designed to defeat [its] critical security features."77 Essentially,
the government wanted to create a "master key, capable of opening
hundreds of millions of locks."7 ' Third, Apple cautioned the court
that other law enforcement operations-local, state, national, and
international investigators wishing to unlock iPhone devices-would
72. Id. at 3-5.
73. See Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, In re Search of
an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus
IS300, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (ordering
that Apple (1) "bypass or disable the auto-erase function," (2) "enable the FBI to
submit passcodes to the SUBJECT DEVICE," and (3) "ensure that when the FBI
submits passcodes to the SUBJECT DEVICE, software running on the device will not
purposefully introduce any additional delay between passcode attempts beyond what
is incurred by Apple hardware").
74. See generally Apple Inc.'s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to
Assist Agents in Search, In re Search of an Apple iPhone, No. ED CM 16-10 (SP) (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Apple's Motion to Vacate].
75. Id. at 1 (explaining that users store a wide variety of information on their
phones, including "financial records and credit card information, health
information, location data, calendars, personal and political beliefs, family
photographs, [and] information about their children").
76. See id. at 2 (characterizing the government's position as wanting "Apple to
create a crippled and insecure product"). Apple was also apprehensive about the
forcible nature of the request, "like compelling a pharmaceutical company against its
will to produce drugs needed to carry out a lethal injection." Id. at 26.
77. Id.at2,12-13.
78. Id. at 3.

2017]

FBI ACCOUNTABILTIY UNDER THE TAKINGS CIAUSE

1307

also want the technology, warning that widespread access would
destabilize its security system.79 Accordingly, Apple argued-with the
support of numerous tech giants that filed amicus briefsso-that the
potential costs to millions of individuals relying on the security of the
iPhone enormously outweighed the FBI's interest in investigating the
case at issue."'
Before resolution of Apple's motion, however, the FBI unlocked
the iPhone without Apple's assistance." The FBI hired professional
hackers to exploit a flaw in Apple's encryption software and develop
hardware that could decipher the four-digit passcode without risking
a data wipe from too many incorrect attempts." Not only did the FBI
side-step Apple to break into the iPhone, but the FBI has refused to
release information on whom it hired and has classified the hackers'
methodology, leaving the public with many unanswered questions."
79. Id. at 3, 24 (counseling the court that "[o]nce the floodgates open, they
cannot be closed"). For instance, Apple worried that acquiescence here would
create precedent to force Apple inevitably to "turn on the microphone in aid of
government surveillance, activate the video camera, surreptitiously record
conversations, or turn on location services to track the phone's user." Id. at 4.
80. See, e.g., Brief for Lavabit LLC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Apple Inc.'s
Motion to Vacate at 11, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution
of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Lavabit Brief] (arguing that government
acquiescence would "harm both [Apple's] competitive advantage, its reputation as a
manufacturer of secure devices, and, by extension, harm other companies ... that
have developed secure storage methods"); Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Apple Inc. at 5, In re Search of an Apple iPhone, No. ED 15-0451M
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016) (claiming that "the government[] ... risk[s] substantial
harm to the security of millions of iPhones").
81. Moreover, Apple initially cooperated with the FBI, "devot[ing] substantial
resources on a 24/7 basis to support the government's investigation," but the FBI
mistakenly foreclosed the only opportunity in which Apple could have helped
without creating a backdoor. See Apple's Motion to Vacate, supra note 74, at 10-11
(explaining that the FBI changed the iCloud password associated with the account,
thus preventing the device from backing up its data automatically).
82. See Government's Status Report at 1-2, In re Search of an Apple iPhone, No. ED
15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016) ("The government has now successfully accessed
the data stored on Farook's iPhone and therefore no longer requires the assistance
from Apple . . . .").
83. See Nakashima, supra note 8.
84. Eric Tucker, FBI Releases Documents Related to San Bernardino iPhone,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 7, 2017), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/016259al4b8d4c3eb
be784f6c564151f/fbi-releases-documents-related-san-bernardino-iphone
(reporting
that the FBI "released 100 pages of heavily censored documents related to its
agreement with an unidentified vendor . . but it did not identify whom it paid to
perform the work or how much it cost"); see also Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 5-8, Associated Press v. Dep't of Justice, No. 1:16-cv-01850-TSC (D.D.C.
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III. WHY THE FBI OWES APPLE 'JUST COMPENSATION"

Apple is the creator of the iPhone, a mini computer that can fit
comfortably in your pocket and simultaneously process calls, text
messages, emails, music, and more. The iPhone is one of the most
innovative pieces of technology: FortuneMagazine reported on a poll
that ranked the iPhone as the eighth greatest invention, one place
below penicillin and six places above the refrigerator." It is obvious,
then, why Apple copyrighted its iPhone software and equipped it with
a digital padlock." Nonetheless, the federal government smashed
that padlock, digitally trespassing and infringing on Apple's
copyrighted software.*7
Apple's encryption provided "Apple with the strongest means
available to ensure the safety and privacy of its customers";" however,
the government misappropriated that technology, thereby harming
Apple's competitive advantage and depriving Apple of its intellectual
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment." Consequently, the
federal government owes Apple 'Just compensation" for damaging
Apple's product and reputation.
A.

Circumventing Copyrighted Software

Traditionally, property has denoted something tangible, such as a
tractor or even the land on which that tractor stood; however,
intangible property also serves an important-if not more
important-function in society. Just as a deed grants an individual
the exclusive right to land, permitting him the sole right to maintain,
neglect, sell, or bequeath it as he chooses, a copyright similarly grants
an individual, usually the creator or author, the exclusive right to
"original works of authorship," permitting him the sole right to
reproduce, recreate, or distribute it as he chooses."o The purpose of

Feb. 20, 2017) (exemplifying litigation following the FBI's denial of Freedom of
Information Act requests for records that would reveal the identity of the hackers

and how much the FBI paid them).
85.

Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Brits Vote iPhone 8th Greatest Invention, FORTUNE (May 20,

2010), http://fortune.com/2010/05/20/brits-vote-iphone-8th-greatest-invention.
86.

See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of

copyrights).
87. See supraPart II (discussing the FBI's conduct pertaining to Apple).
88.

Apple's Motion to Vacate, supranote 74, at 5.

89.
90.

See infra Section III.B.2.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2012). Copyrights may include the following: "(1)

literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic
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copyrights is to encourage and "stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good" by granting the author a statutory monopoly on
the fruits of his labor." This exclusive "right to market" incentivizes
authors to produce a work for the benefit of society because they
know they will be the beneficiaries of any such efforts."
Thus, when others invade an owner's valid copyright, the owner
may enforce his right to exclude. In addition to prohibiting the
simple reproduction of copyrighted work," the United States Code
also affords copyright owners with anti-circumvention protections.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) states that "[n]o
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a [copyrighted] work."" Specifically, the DMCA
makes it unlawful "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or
impair a technological measure, without the authority of the
copyright owner."96 Although the DMCA provides an exception for
law enforcement activities, it applies with full force to private actors,
essentially incentivizing the creation of digital padlocks to protect
copyrighted material and discouraging hackers from breaking those
padlocks or casting unauthorized keys to them."

works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." § 102.
91. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(opining that the purpose of "copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor ... [and] to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good").
92. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985)
(highlighting that copyrights allow the author to "enjoy the right to market the
original expression contained therein as just compensation for their investment"); see
also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff'd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that copyright owners "invest[]
huge sums ... in reliance upon a legal framework that, through the law of copyright,
has ensured that they will have the exclusive right to copy and distribute those
[works] for economic gain").
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting the exclusive right to "reproduce," "prepare
derivative works," or "distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work").
94. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C. § 1201).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1).
96. § 1201 (a) (3) (A).
97. § 1201(e).
98. See Sanney, supra note 61, at 355-56 (detailing that the DMCA "allow[s]
copyright owners to create these [digital rights management] locks to control how
end users can access, copy, or convert information goods, such as software, music,
movies, or books and restrict access to their works in order to protect those works
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Copyright owners commonly secure their works with a digital
padlock, using the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision as a backstop
For example, motion picture
to prevent unauthorized access.'
companies place digital padlocks on DVDs to prevent the
unauthorized copying of their movies." These digital padlocks
encrypt (or scramble) movies and permit only authorized hardware,
such as DVD players, to decrypt (or unscramble) the movies for play."o1
Smartphone manufacturers similarly employ the DMCA to protect
One example involves the process coined
their copyrights.
"jailbreaking," in which hackers exploit flaws in Apple's iPhone software
to install applications and modify the software without Apple's
authorization."o2 To prevent this practice, the Phone's software is
imbedded with digital padlocks that prevent the unauthorized
installation of programs, "forc [ing] both developers and consumers of
iPhone applications to use the [Apple-run] App Store.""os Essentially,
Apple performs the role of gatekeeper: it controls the pool of programs
available to consumers, not only to ensure payment but to maintain the
company's high security standards.'
Although hackers who undermine these security standards by
jailbreaking iPhones are circumventing a digital padlock, they do not
necessarily violate the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision. Under
the Act, Congress delegated to the Librarian of Congress the
authority to establish rules defining the scope of the DMCA.o' After

from infringement"). However, the Act also provides a "fair use" exception. See 17
U.S.C. § 107.
99. To prevail in a claim under the DMCA, a plaintiff "must prove: (1) ownership
of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively controlled by a technological measure,
which has been circumvented, (3) that third parties can now access (4) without
authorization, in a manner that (5) infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by
designed or
the Copyright Act, because of a product that (6) the defendant ...
producedprimarily for circumvention." Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc.,
381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
100. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
101. Id.
102. See Kevin Rogers, Jailbroken: Examining the Policy and Legal Implications of iPhone
Jailbreaking, 13 Prrr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 1-4 (2013) (describing the technical
aspects ofjailbreaking).
Towards a
103. Michael K. Cheng, Note, iPhone failbreaking Under the DMCA:
FunctionalistApproach in Anti-Circumvention, 25 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 215, 220 (2010).
104. See id. at 221-24 (detailing the complexities of jailbreaking and the
contentious "goal of [hackers to] defeat[] the iPhone's lock-in protections").
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (C) (2012).
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a contentious period that outlawed jailbreaking,'o the Librarian of
Congress issued a rule creating a very narrow exception to the
DMCA's prosecutorial reach: the rule permits the jailbreaking of
smartphones, but only to run "lawfully obtained software
applications" or remove unwanted software that came preinstalled on
the phone.' 0 7 However, hackers may still be liable under the DMCA
for circumventing digital padlocks protecting copyrighted material
for purposes that do not fall into the Librarian of Congress's narrow
rule, such as running software that Apple has not sanctioned.
B.

Enforcing the Takings Clause Against the FBI

To determine whether a deprived property owner is owed just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, two inquiries are
necessary. The federal government is constitutionally required to pay
for the private property it appropriates only if (1) the taken item
constitutes "property" under the Fifth Amendment, and (2) the
government's conduct with the item constitutes a "taking" under the
Fifth Amendment. 0 ' Under these inquiries, the federal government
partially deprived Apple of its copyrighted software, a protected form
of "property" under the Fifth Amendment, by creating technology to
circumvent the passcode on the San Bernardino shooter's iPhone.
Accordingly, it owes Apple 'Just compensation" for narrowing the
scope of Apple's valid copyrighted software, jeopardizing the privacy
of hundreds of millions of iPhone users, and thus diminishing
Apple's competitive advantage based on its security. 109
1.

Apple's copyrighted software constitutes "property"under the Fifth
Amendment
Although the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether
certain intangible properties, such as copyrights, constitute
"property" under the Fifth Amendment, copyright owners should

106. See Ezra Mechaber, Here's How Cell Phone Unlocking Became Legal, NAT'L ARCHIVES:
OBAMAWHTTE HousE (Aug. 15, 2014, 12:53 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
that
(explaining
/blog/2014/08/15/heres-how-cell-phone-unlockingbecame-legal
114,000 people signed an online petition calling to make cell phone jailbreaking
legal after the Library of Congress entirely banned the practice).
107. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,944, 65,953 (Oct. 28, 2015)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b) (4)).
108. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (outlining a proper takings analysis).
109. The magnitude of the federal government's diminution and the value of the
"justcompensation" owed to Apple is beyond the scope of this Note.
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enjoy the same economic compensation that the Takings Clause
affords owners of taken tangible property. First, numerous courts of
appeals-particularly the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
circuits-have all suggested that copyrights satisfy the definition of
Moreover, the
property protected by the Fifth Amendment.1
property as
of
intangible
forms
other
has
recognized
Court
Supreme
"property" for Takings Clause purposes. In Ruckeishaus v. Monsanto
Co.,"' for example, the Court established that trade secrets constitute
property, comparing trade secrets to "more tangible forms of
property" because a "trade secret is assignable" and "can form the res
of a trust.""' Similarly, the Court has recognized other intangible
property rights as property under the Takings Clause. Patent rights,
for instance, have been considered "property" since the nineteenth
Copyrights also derive from statute, so they create
century.113
precisely the same type of right as patents.H 4 Because the Court has
already recognized as property intangible rights such as trade secrets
and patents, recognizing copyrights would be a natural extension and
within the spirit of the Takings Clause.
Second, copyrights share many of the same attributes as other types
of property recognized under the Takings Clause. Personal property
undoubtedly falls within the purview of the Takings Clause,"' and
various bodies of law deem copyrights a form of "personal property."
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, .for instance, debtors can
obtain credit by extending an interest in property, which includes

110. See supra notes 37-42 (citing decisions by various courts of appeals); see also
supranote 43 (comparing positions of legal scholars on the issue).
111. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
112. See id. at 1002-04.
113. See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881) (clarifying that patents
"confer[] upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which
cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without just compensation, any
more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented
to a private purchaser"); see also Christopher S. Storm, FederalPatent Takings, 2 J. Bus.
NEsl sHIP & L. 1, 7 (2008) (reviewing the Supreme Court jurisprudence and
ENR
determining that the "historical evidence still weighs in favor of patents as constitutional
property, even if the Supreme Court is not bound by such a finding").
114. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (granting patent owners the right of
exclusivity), with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting copyright owners the right of exclusivity).
115. See Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425-28 (2015) (reassuring that
"[t]he Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes
your car, just as when it takes your home," and holding that a crop of raisins fall
within the purview of the Takings Clause).
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both registered and unregistered copyrights."' In accordance with
this notion, the Takings Clause should "protect[] 'private property'
without any distinction between different types.""
Lastly, owners have no other recourse to remediate a governmental
copyright infringement. Although some courts have maintained that
the Takings Clause should not apply when the property owner has a
,statutory remedy,118 copyright owners have no such remedy. A
statutory remedy would exist under the DMCA if the hacker were a
private citizen," but no comparable remedy is available under the
DMCA when the hacker is a sovereign or law enforcement
authority.1 20 Although Congress has expressly waived the federal
government's sovereign immunity pertaining
to copyright
infringement generally,"' courts have held that the federal
government is immune from violations of the DMCA."' Because no
116. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a) (42) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1977)
(defining general intangibles); id. § 9-109(a) (1) (identifying the scope of secured
transactions as "a transaction ...
that creates a security interest in personal
property"); In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 244 B.R. 149, 151, 156 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1999), af'd, 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the proper method of filing
for registered and unregistered copyrights under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code). See generally Kenneth B. Axe, Creation, Perfection and Enforcement of
Security Interests in Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 119 BA"ING L.J. 62, 76-78 (2002) (discussing various issues pertaining to the
perfection of general intangibles, such as copyrights).
117. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2425 (holding that the "government's 'categorical
duty' under the Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation when it 'physically takes
possession of an interest in property"' applies to personal property (quoting Ark.
Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012)).
118. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 642 n.7 (1999) ("There is no suggestion . . that Congress had in mind the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment [when passing the Patent Remedy
Act] ....
[W]e think this omission precludes consideration of the Just
Compensation Clause as a basis for the Patent Remedy Act."); Zoltek Corp. v. United
States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), vacated, 672 F.3d 1309
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (maintaining that plaintiffs cannot use the Takings Clause to receive
just compensation if they also have a statutory remedy of patent infringement).
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (outlining civil remedies available).
120. See id. § 1201(e) (exempting "any lawfully authorized investigative, protective,
information security, or intelligence activity of an officer, agent, or employee of the
United States, [or] State").
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (b) (waiving sovereign immunity "whenever the copyright
in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States shall be
infringed by the United States, by a corporation owned or controlled by the United
States, or by a contractor, subcontractor, or any person ...
acting for the
Government and with the authorization or consent of the Government").
122. See, e.g., Blueport Co., LLP v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 768, 781-82 (2006)
(entertaining a claim for monetary damages against the United States, but holding
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other remedy is available to copyright holders for governmental
infringement, copyrights should constitute property under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to compensate victimized
copyright owners from governmental interference.
FBI's hacking constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment
By shattering the digital padlock protecting Apple's copyrighted
software, the federal government triggered the trip wire known as the
Takings Clause, designed to deter tyrannical misappropriation.
Though no "magic formula" exists to compute a governmental
taking, one distinguishing characteristic is front and center in any
It follows that by forcibly
deprivation of property.
analysis:
circumventing Apple's encryption, the federal government partially
deprived Apple of its copyrighted software and thus owes Apple 'just
compensation" for the deprivation.
2.

a.

Placingthe FBI's conduct on the spectrum of governmental
interference

Although concluding that the federal government deprived Apple
of a portion of its valid copyrights is apparent, labeling such
deprivation as a per se or Penn Central taking is much more opaque.
The FBI narrowed the scope of Apple's available copyrights by
essentially precluding Apple from fully-enforcing its copyrighted
encryption method that protects users' information.
Indeed,
reasonable minds may differ on where to place the FBI's conduct on
the spectrum of governmental interference. On the one hand, one
may consider the FBI's conduct as a Penn Central taking because the
state action merely diminished, rather than eviscerated, the economic
value of Apple's software. Under this theory, each aspect of Apple's
copyrights-the scope, length of time, enforcement mechanisms,
etc.-is indivisible, so circumventing its encryption marginally
decreases the overall value of the Apple iPhone software. In the
proverbial bundle of sticks, rather than withdrawing a singular stick
from Apple's bundle, the FBI has preserved each stick in the bundle
but, through its hacking, has marginally devalued the entire bundle.

that "[t]here is no clear statement waiving sovereign immunity on the part of the
government for claims arising under the DMCA"); see also John Timmer, Air Force
Cracks Software, Carpet Bombs DMCA, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 4, 2008, 2:02 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2008/08/air-force-cracks-software-carpet-bombsdmca (noting that "the [Blueport] decision highlights the significant limits to the
application of copyright law to the government charged with enforcing it").
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On the other hand, one may observe the FBI's conduct as a per se
taking because the state action eviscerated the economic value of a
particular portion of Apple's software. Under this theory, each aspect
of Apple's copyrights is divisible, so circumventing its encryption
renders that aspect of Apple's copyrights-the aspect that allows
Apple to fully-enforce its copyrighted encryption portion of its
software--economically valueless. Rather than devalue the entire
bundle of sticks, the FBI has withdrawn one of the sticks from the
bundle entirely, rendering that singular stick valueless.
The distinction between per se and Penn Central takings here is
nuanced but important in determining the FBI's liability under the
Takings Clause. Deeming the FBI's conduct a Penn Central taking
seems natural considering a copyright's abstract nature. But, this
instinctual comfort derives from the mere fact that copyrights are a
form of intangible property. Though copyrights fit comfortably in
the Penn Central takings framework, courts are unfortunately more
reluctant to find Penn Central takings compared to per se takings.
Intangible property rights-such as copyrights, patents, and trade
secrets-are vital to our society; although the Framers may not have
conceived of intangible takings, courts should not hesitate to protect
them from governmental intrusion.
b.

Characterizingthe FBI's conduct as a taking

Regardless of whether the analysis is steeped in Penn Central or per
se takings jurisprudence, the federal government digitally trespassed
on Apple's copyrighted property. Equivalent to a recorded deed for
a house, Apple enjoys valid copyrights; it has the exclusive right to
reproduce, recreate, alter, and distribute its iPhone software."' Like
any house equipped with a lock on the front door, Apple encrypted
its copyrighted software. That encrypted software protects a variety of
security features: iPhones grant access to users only after the user
correctly inputs a "user-determined, numeric passcode," and iPhones
provide an optional setting that automatically erases all data after ten
erroneous attempts at the passcode, a feature that is "fused into the
However, the federal government circumvented Apple's
phone.""2
encryption and created a "master key, capable of opening hundreds
of millions of locks," essentially permitting anyone in the

123. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106; Apple iOS 9.0 Software, Copyright No.
TX0008205229 (registered Sept. 16, 2015).
124. Apple's Motion to Vacate, supra note 74, at 5-6; Government's Ex Parte
Application, supranote 5, at 3-5.
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neighborhood to walk right through the front door and access users'
most intimate information. 25
Notwithstanding the fact that sovereign immunity protects the
government from DMCA liability, 12 a proper analysis would conclude
that the federal government, if acting as a private citizen, infringed
Apple's copyrights, buttressing a governmental taking. Apple imbeds
its iPhone software with digital padlocks-for example, the
encryption that impeded the FBI's ability to bypass the user passcode
on the phone at issue.1' The DMCA proscribes any efforts to "bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair" any digital padlock to access
copyrighted material.' Although the FBI has heavily censored the
methodology that thwarted Apple's digital padlocks,'" it seems likely
that the FBI infringed Apple's copyrighted software. Considering
that the encryption key was "fused into the phone,"' the hackers
must have "bypass[ed], remove[d], or deactivate[d]" the software to
Holding the federal
gain access to the iPhone's storage."'
government accountable for its hacking, therefore, is within the
general spirit of the DMCA, which is to prevent hackers from
circumventing digital padlocks protecting copyrighted material, such
as Apple's copyrighted software.1 12 Because Apple has no recourse
under the DMCA, its only available option is to seek recompense
under the Takings Clause; precluding such a remedy would result in
arbitrary and unfettered governmental interference.

125. Apple's Motion to Vacate, supra note 74, at 3; cf Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (finding a taking where a New
York law requiring landlords to permit a cable television company to install some
equipment on the roof was a "permanent physical occupation"). In its motion,
Apple vowed that it would have had to "create a new version of the iPhone operating
system designed to defeat the critical security features." Apple's Motion to Vacate,
supra note 74, at 12. Thus, the federal government must have altered the iPhone's
operating system to create the key to bypass its security features.
126. See supranote 122 and accompanying text.
127. See Apple's Motion to Vacate, supra note 74, at 5-6 (describing the iPhone's
security features).
Furthermore, the jailbreaking exemption,
128. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (3) (A).
discussed above, applies only to keys that allow the devices "to execute lawfully
obtained software applications." See 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (b) (4) (2016).
129. See Tucker, supra note 84.
130. Government's Ex Parte Application, supranote 5, at 5.
131. See § 1201(a) (3) (A); Apple's Motion to Vacate, supra note 74, at 12 (opining
that the FBI wanted Apple to modify the software to guarantee that the auto-erase
function was turned off).
132. See supraSection III.A (discussing the characteristics of the DMCA).
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Moreover, by readily circumventingApple's encryption methods, the
federal government is implicitly devaluing encryption devices, thereby
narrowing the scope of Apple's options to enforce its copyrights. The
government effectuates a taking when it prevents a property owner
from exercising his legal rights attached to the property, affecting its
present use and value.' In Lucas, for example, the Court found a
taking when a law prohibited construction on beachfront property,
thereby decreasing the market price of those beachfront lots."'
Similarly, the FBI is devaluing encryption mechanisms by forcibly
breaking the one protecting Apple's software.
Encryption
mechanisms protect information stored on smartphones with a
digital padlock; although Congress and some state legislatures have
proposed bills that would require tech companies to give law
enforcement authorities a key to this padlock, none have become
law.' 5 While the law enforcement exception possibly indicates that
Congress did not intend to provide a remedy under the DMCA,
Congress cannot limit constitutional protections for property
determined to be within the scope of the Takings Clause.

133. Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259, 267-68 (1946) (finding a
government taking when military flight over a claimant's property caused the
"destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm"), with Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978) (finding no taking for a
zoning decision because the "New York City law ha[d] in nowise impaired the
present use of the Terminal").
134. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007, 1081-82 (1992).
135. See Andy Greenberg, The Senate's Draft Encryption Bill Is "Ludicrous, Dangerous,
Technically Illiterate,"WRED (Apr. 8, 2016, 11:16 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/
04/senates-draft-encryption-bill-privacy-nightmare (outlining a U.S. Senate bill that
"would make illegal the sort of user-controlled encryption that's in every modern
iPhone"); see also Andrew Crocker, Worried About Apple? California Has a Bill that
Would Disable Encryption on All Phones, ELECTRONIC FRoNTI FouND. (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/worried-about-apple-california-has-billwould-disable-encryption-all-phones (criticizing a "new [California] State Assembly
bill [that] would ban default encryption features on all smartphones"); Dennis
Fisher, New York Wants to Force Vendors to Decrypt Users'Phones, ON THE WIRE (Jan. 13,
2016),
https://www.onthewire.io/new-york-wants-to-force-vendors-to-decrypt-usersphones (discussing a New York state bill that would "require that smartphone
manufacturers build mechanisms into the devices that would allow the companies to
decrypt or unlock them on demand from law enforcement"). Moreover, Attorney
General Jeff Sessions supports law enforcement's ability to circumvent encryption
devices. See William Turton, Trump's Attorney GeneralPick Wants to Give Cops Encryption
Backdoors, GIZMODO (Jan. 24, 2017, 9:27 AM), http://gizmodo.com/trumps-attorneygeneral-pick-wants-to-give-cops-encrypt-1 791556095 (quoting Sessions during his
confirmation process as stating that it is "critical ... that national security and
criminal investigators be able to overcome encryption").
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The federal government is essentially choosing winners and losers
by narrowing the scope of Apple's copyrighted software without
legislation and affecting Apple's present-day value. Competition in
the smartphone industry is fierce,1 6 and the FBI jeopardized the
vitality of Apple when it fundamentally undermined Apple's security.
Apple sells a brand, not just a product, and its customers "have come
to trust the Apple brand.""' Hundreds of millions of people around
the world store intimate and sensitive information on their iPhones:
doctors store "confidential medical information," lawyers have
"privileged communications with their clients," and common users
save "financial information, emails, text messages, personal notes,
Lavabit, an email
reminders, [and] calendar appointments.""'
service prized for its security, filed an amicus brief in support of
Apple and warned that a reputation for protecting users' privacy is
important in this industry, describing the harm that the government
caused when it previously breached Lavabit's secure email service.
Additionally, Hushmail, a provider of encrypted email, was
"economically devastated" when the government breached

136. SeeJack Linshi, This 1 Chart Shows How Intense the Apple-Samsung Rivalry Really
Is, TIff (Apr. 29, 2015), http://time.com/3840414/samsung-apple-market-share
(characterizing the competition between phone manufacturers Apple and Samsung
as a "battle"); Manish Singh, Samsung Gave Apple Stiff Competition in the US in 2015:
Report, GADGETS360 (Feb. 11, 2016), http://gadgets.ndtv.com/mobiles/news/samsu
that
(explaining
ng-gave-apple-stiff-competition-in-the-us-in-2015-report-801269
"Apple's dominance in the United States may not last so long" and that other players,
such as LG, Motorola, and HTC, are also growing); Ewan Spence, Samsung Topples
Apple as Galaxy S7 Defeats iPhone, FORBES (May 4, 2016, 7:24 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ewanspence/2016/05/04/samsung-overtakes-apple-ussmartphone-sales (reporting that "Samsung has reclaimed the top spot" for
smartphone devices in the U.S. market).
137. Lavabit Brief, supranote 80, at 9.
138. Id. at 9, 11. Smartphones have a seemingly limitless capacity to store
information; the Supreme Court has even said that "these devices are in fact
minicomputers." Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
139. The FBI "sought to access encrypted e-mails stored on the Lavabit server,
which were impossible to access without a user's password." Lavabit Brief, supranote
80, at 5. Lavabit explained that after the FBI acquired the "encryption key," it could
"intercept, decrypt, inspect, and modify ... all of [the] connections between Lavabit
and the outside world" and access the target's data. Id.; see also Michael Phillips, How
the Government Killed a Secure E-Mail Company, NEW YORKER (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/how-the-government-killed-a-secure-email-company (describing the FBI's effort to break Lavabit's encryption because
Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency subcontractor who leaked
classified information, sent an email from a Lavabit email address).
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Hushmail's secured emails for investigative purposes."'o Overall, the
government's role in breaching technology security has reduced
privacy, dwindled consumer confidence, and severely impacted the
U.S. economy, costing security companies billions of dollars.'
Further exacerbating the problem, the FBI is sharing this new master
key with other law enforcement agencies, opening the floodgates that
Apple predicted." Foreign sovereigns-including China, Turkey,
and Russia 1 4s-have requested the technology from the FBI, and so
far the FBI has agreed to assist law enforcement authorities in
Arkansas.' Because the federal government crafted and distributed
a master key to the digital padlocks protecting Apple's copyrighted
iPhone software and damaged Apple's reputation and competitive
advantage, the FBI partially deprived Apple of its property and thus
owes it 'just compensation" for the diminution.4
140. See Lavabit Brief, supra note 80, at 11-12; see also Ryan Singel, Encrypted E-Mail
Company Hushmail Spills to Feds, WIRED (Nov.
7, 2007, 3:39 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai
(following the demise of
Hushmail, who "market[ed] itself by saying that 'not even a Hushmail employee with
access to our servers can read your encrypted e-mail,"' and detailing how it
responded to a court order by "turn[ing] over 12 CDs worth of e-mails from three
Hushmail accounts").
141. See Laura K Donohue, High Technology, Consumer Privacy, and U.S. National
Security, 4 AM. U. Bus. L. REV. 11, 15 (2015) (contending that "NSA programs, and
public awareness of them, have had an immediate and detrimental impact on the
U.S. economy... cost[ing] U.S. companies billions of dollars in lost sales" as
consumers question their security and privacy).
142. See Apple's Motion to Vacate, supra note 74, at 24 (predicting that other
agencies and governments would seek similar access to Apple's software).
143. See Serhat Kurt, Turkey & Russia Want to Unlock iPhone of Russian Ambassador's
Killer (Updated), MAC REPORTS (Dec. 22, 2016), http://macreports.com/turkey-russiawant-unlock-iphone-russian-ambassadors-killer ("Looking for leads on the terrorist's
iPhone 4s, Turkish police and Russian authorities want to crack the PIN code on the
device to access its content.").
144. Reena Flores, FBI Pledges to Assist Local Police in Unlocking iPhones, CBS NEWS

(Apr. 2, 2016, 1:36 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-pledges-to-assist-localpolice-in-unlocking-iphones ("[T]he FBI offered their assistance [to local law
enforcement agencies] in hacking the Apple phones in cases where they could
provide evidence."); James Queally & Richard Winton, FBI Agrees to Help Arkansas
Prosecutors Open iPhone After Hack of San BernardinoDevice, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2016,
9:22 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-arkansas-fbi-phone-access20160330-story.html ("Though the FBI might want to use the new tool to help solve
other criminal cases, doing so would also make the process subject to discovery
during criminal trials and place the information in the public domain . . . .").

145.

See Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (2015) (advising that the

federal government has a "'categorical duty' under the Fifth Amendment to pay just
compensation when it 'physically takes possession of an interest in property"'

(quoting Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012))).
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CONCLUSION

The federal government seems to justify its hack because it is
limited to "U]ust this once" and "U]ust this phone";" however, this is
not the first time that it has sacrificed individual privacy, and this is
not the first security mechanism that it has breached. Through its
investigative arm, the federal government irreversibly destroyed the
reputation of Lavabit, an email service prized for its security; it
"economically devastated" Hushmail, a provider of encrypted
emails; 4 it cost American businesses billions of dollars, crushing
consumer confidence in certain products;"' and it circumvented
Apple's encryption software protecting sensitive information, such as
financial records, family photos, and private emails." 9
The federal government has consistently and deliberately chosen
to sacrifice the individual liberties and privacy of hundreds of
millions of Americans. In the last decade, the government has
seemingly subscribed to the mantra that it is better to beg for
forgiveness than ask for permission. 50 However, the government now
seems to be shifting from an innocuous form of paternalism to a
tyrannical form of taking, leaving those afflicted without a remedy.
By hacking Apple's digital padlocks protecting its copyrighted
software, the FBI has unilaterally narrowed the scope of Apple's
copyrighted property, thus qualifying as a "taking" and warranting
'just compensation" prescribed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The FBI digitally trespassed onto Apple's copyrighted
property and ostensibly prohibited encryption mechanisms for data,
narrowing the scope of which Apple can enforce its copyrights.
Moreover, the FBI has damaged Apple's reputation, injured its
competitive advantage, and-most of all-jeopardized the sensitive
information of hundreds of millions of iPhone users, now vulnerable

146. Apple's Motion to Vacate, supra note 74, at 3, see also Government's Ex Parte
Application, supra note 5, at 4 (summarizing that the government sought Apple's
help in accessing "the SUBJECT DEVICE only" (emphasis added)).
147. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
148. See Donohue, supra note 141, at 15.
149. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
150. See Margo Schlanger, IntelligenceLegalism and the NationalSecurity Agency's Civil
Liberties Gap, 6 HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 112, 113 (2015) (arguing that intelligence
legalism, simply asking whether a position is legal rather than practical, "gives
systematically insufficient weight to individual liberty, and that its relentless focus on
rights, and compliance, and law has obscured the absence of what should be an
additional focus on interests, or balancing, or policy").
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to hackers, identity thieves, hostile foreign agents, and unwarranted
government surveillance." 1
The Takings Clause compensates individuals for incurring private
costs for the public benefit.
The FBI circumvented Apple's
encryption and altered the iPhone's security software to investigate a
single criminal act. That alteration could be the master key that
eventually empowers the FBI to open hundreds of millions of
iPhones. Privacy advocates desire governmental transparency and
accountability; security advocates desire governmental surveillance
and strength. Our Constitution demands 'just compensation" for the
deprivation of property rights, and holding the government
accountable for the economic damage it causes may provide a proper
balance to these competing interests.
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is a simple solution for a
company deprived of its valid copyrights, yet its application could be
the harvest that ends a remedial famine caused by governmental
intrusion.'"' The FBI may have found the information it sought from
the San Bernardino shooter, but in the future, the agency should
consider in its calculus the economic consequences of such
governmental intrusion. The government may have found the first
bite of the Apple sweet, but it may come to find the second bite
intolerably sour.

151. SeeApple's Motion to Vacate, supra note 74, at 2-3.
152. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MoNEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1913) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman."); see also Cradle of Liberty Council, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
851 F. Supp. 2d 936, 953 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (interpreting Justice Brandeis' quotation
and explaining "what he meant by that [quotation] is that when government action
is exposed to the public when the public sees what's going on ... the government
tends to be on its best behavior").

